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By Reginald Herbold Green
Perspectives
The Namibian economy has stabilised since 1985 with growth around 2.5$ a year. 
The end of drought, improved world mineral markets and fish catch recoveries 
plus a revival of investor confidence are contributory factors.
So is an end to a fiscal rake's progress. The 1988—1989 budget outturn was a 
cash flow surplus of R 37 million - vs an anticipated deficit on R 230 
million. Non-borrowed receipts of R 1 ,8 7 8 million exceeded recurrent spending 
with net borrowing of R 133 million going toward capital spending (R 160 
million) and cash balance improvement.
Private investment - basically mining and construction rose about a third. 
This suggests output recovery with a 1 to 2 year lag in the mining sector.
But stabilisation has limits. 1988 GDP at constant prices is 92$ of 1980 
overall and 72$ per capita - a result worse than the Sub-Saharan African 
average and even than RSA itself. For mining the overall output index is 7 8$. 
Real fixed capital stock in 1988 is 6$ above 1980 but 15$ down in the primary 
and 17$ in the secondary production sectors.
Despite terms of trade gains, 1988 saw both a real physical import fall and 
the first current account deficit since 19 81. Capital flight and remittances 
continue to be high (R 50 million per month according to a demi-official 
statement). Public infrastructure is probably now deteriorating and vacancies 
in professional staffing in some ministries have risen from 10$ in 1984 to 30$ 
now.
Public services are clearly both inadequate in coverage and cash constrained. 
About two-thirds of Namibians continue to exist in absolute poverty and 
300,000 are internal refugees.
Problematics
The dominant problematic is RSA action. First, how much will the election 
outturn be 'adjusted' from registration through counting? Second, how 
obstructive will the AG be in respect to the constitution writing process and 
'certifying' its end product? Third, how will RSA respond to actions it has 
already warned will bring retaliation, e.g. ending tariff preferences to RSA 
or free remittability of income and capital; serious land reform or alteration 
of senior civil services contracts or personnel? And how will it react to 
steps that it, to date, 'merely' calls folly, e.g. an independent currency, a 
Namibian controlled port if RSA remains in illegal occupation of Walvis Bay? 
As crucial will its tactics be limited to economic reprisals or extend to 
creating and injecting armed bandit/armed rebel (MNR/UNITA look alike) 
terrorist and sabotage forces?
Fiscal and external RSA raised 'debt' problematics are not as severe as 
supposed. Because of the Mandate Revocation and other international 
conventions, Namibia has no obligation for the latter and the supposed 1989/90 
deficit is based on very conservative revenue and high 'debt' 
repayment/charges/interest estimates.
Because of the RSA problematic, trade and transport access are uncertain - 
thus the balance of payments and output levels may not be as free from major 
downside risk as might otherwise be expected. For the same reason, white
(settler and global) confidence is potentially at risk.
SWAPO's initial economic strategy and policy stance is fairly clearly
pragmatic and focussed on rehabilitation and incremental reform. But that 
approach may also be problematic. On currency, customs, transport, land and
wages/salaries radical (one way or another) decisions cannot be deferred
except at high costs. And even cautious extension of services, rehabilitation
of internal refugee livelihoods and wage increases could lead to
overdetermination through total commitments in excess of total resource 
availablility.
Prognosis
Namibia is a graveyard for predictions. Nonetheless a tentative prognosis may 
be possible.
First SWAPO or a SWAPO-led coalition will win two-thirds of the Constitutional 
Assembly seats, draft an independence constitution not offering hostages to 
RSA (e.g. on debt, civil services, land, 19 66 -8 9 contracts) and make it the
basis for independence. This does require a tougher UN stance than to date, 
but the trend is in that direction. If this prognosis is not met the 
subsequent scenario is invalid.
Second, overall macroeconomic and fiscal policy will be cautious with broadly 
acceptable (not to all Namibians, settlers or investors) land and foreign 
investment compromises. However, rapid (12 to 18 months) movement to an
independent external tariff, currency and Namibian controlled port will be 
launched and major government restructuring (including both institutional 
patterns and top officials) will take place.
Third, under these conditions most private investors will stay and reinvest 
and substantial personnel and financial external assistance will be available 
- albeit lags in its delivery will create acute difficulties.
Fourth, as a result of the above, basic service expansion and increased 
infrastructural maintenance and extension will be consistent with fiscal
balance at least after the initial 6 to 12 months of independence.
Fifth, production will fall for one to two years in agriculture and fishing as 
a result of settler departures (with boats, vehicles and livestock) but mining 
and manufacturing should expand as should construction. Except for domestic 
service, employment should rise. Employment growth, expansion of basic 
services and rural income development efforts should reduce the number of 
households in absolute poverty as should rehabilitation of internal refugee
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livelihoods but the pace will disappoint poor Namibians and give rise to some 
social and political tensions - including with trade unions and churches.
Sixth, the balance of payments should - within 12-18 months - be in overall 
balance and indeed allow a buildup of external reserves. The combination of 
mineral export growth and external assistance should outweigh 
agricultural/fishing export falls and more basic consumer goods/investment 
input imports. Withdrawal from SACUA should reduce import costs.
Seventh, South Africa will react negatively to Namibian actions but will not 
launch a proxy war in Namibia. (This is also a prognosis whose invalidation 
would render the entire scenario wrong. It rests on de Klerk's brief record 
as leader and his longer history of caution, not adventurism.) On cooperation 
on currency conversion and creation of transport and (for beef/mutton) 
marketing difficulties will entail significant transitional costs as will 
procurement of some premature managerial/professional departures, but will not 
wreck rehabilitation and recovery.
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